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Reported rates of sexual assault in the military have increased dramatically over the past 10 years 
(Groves, 2013). One reason for the pervasiveness of sexual assault is the reporting structure. 
Despite changes in the way sexual assault complaints are handled, there continue to be numerous 
sexual assault scandals (Childress, 2013). The purpose of this study is to examine how the 
military’s chain of command influences the reporting procedures, and how this may influence the 
military’s ability to prevent sexual assaults. This thesis examines three case studies specifically 
focusing on military sexual assault reporting.   
Keywords: military sexual assault, military chain of command, Tailhook Scandal, Aberdeen, 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Sexual Assault is a problem that has affected the military for decades. The way sexual 
assault is handled in the military is very different from the way it is handled outside of it. More 
recently, the military has come under serious scrutiny for its policies and treatment of sexual 
assault on several different occasions. Despite this scrutiny, the sexual assault problem in the 
military persists.  
 According to Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 6495.01, Sexual Assault 
Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, sexual assault is defined as follows: 
“Intentional sexual contact characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or abuse 
of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape, 
forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual contact that is aggravated, 
abusive, or wrongful (including unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact), or attempts 
to commit these acts” (Military One Source, 2013, para.2). 
There is a difficulty in researching military sexual assault because it was not well 
documented previous to the 1990s. The oldest case of sexual assault in the military occurred 
during the Vietnam War. The exact details of this case are currently unknown. However, the 
military sexual assault problem did not become public until 1991 with the Tailhook scandal 
which will be discussed in chapter 4.  
What is known is that military sexual assault is an ongoing problem. According to the 
2011 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, there were 3192 
reports of sexual assault in the military (Department of Defense, 2011). Of these reports only 240 
went to trial. Of these 240 cases that went to trial only 65 offenders were punished with prison 
time.  Sexual Assault in the military is vastly underreported. Based on estimates from the 
Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, the DoD estimates that over 
19,000 sexual assault incidents occurred in the military in 2011. This number is more than five 
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times the number actually reported (Jacob, 2012). The underreporting of sexual assault in the 
military as well as the differences between the amount of sexual assault reports and the meager 
number of trials has led to the scrutiny of the sexual assault reporting procedures in the military. 
Between 2011 and 2012 sexual assault rates rose 34% and the percentage of victims 
reporting the assault dropped 27%. Forty-seven percent of the victims who chose not to report 
indicated that they did not report due to fear or retaliation. This is not surprising considering 62% 
of victims who did report experienced professional, social or administrative retaliation 
(Department of Defense, 2012).  
Recent high profile military sexual assault cases have brought this problem to light. In 
June 2011 at the Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas several trainees came forward 
with sexual assault allegations against their training instructors. In total 62 victims were 
identified, all of them trainees, and 32 perpetrators were identified, all of them training 
instructors. What this case demonstrates is that offenders can fall anywhere in the chain of 
command. In this case high ranking officer sexually assaulted victims who were not even 
finished with basic training (Risen, 2013).  
 Lackland is one of many sexual assault cases in the military. This research examines 
three case studies of high profile military sexual assault each occurring over 10 years previous to 
Lackland. This study is extremely important because the military’s policies regarding sexual 
assault reporting and military’s culture are contributing to the sexual assault problem. The chain 
of command has been cited as contributing to the pervasiveness of sexual assault. Allegations of 
sexual assault in the military are handled within the chain of command. The chain of command 
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has been problematic in many reported cases of sexual assault and it is therefore important that it 
be evaluated.  
 The research question assessed in this paper is: Does the sexual assault reporting process 
contribute to the pervasiveness of sexual assault in the military? This study examines whether the 
prevalence of sexual assault in the military resulted from the way sexual assaults are handled in 
the chain of command. The hypothesis of this study is that the pervasiveness of sexual assault in 
the military is partially the result of the formal processes through which sexual assaults are 





Chapter Two: Culture of the Military, and Policy Relevance 
The culture of the military is very unique. During basic training, or boot camp, recruits 
are re-socialized into the military culture in order to prepare them for combat operations. Hunter 
explains four main aspects of the military culture: (1) language; (2) acceptance of violence; (3) 
objectification of people, and (4) and keeping up appearances (2007). The first aspect is 
language. The military has its own language that service members must learn in order to become 
a part of the military subculture. For example, in the military, the bathroom becomes the latrine 
and a bed is a rack. Further, the military language is regarded as very sexualized. Certain sexual 
phrases are often used to describe tasks or objects. For example, when a task is considered 
undesirable it is referred to as “tits time” (Hunter, 2007).  
 The second aspect is the acceptance of violence. Violence is a necessary and accepted 
element of military culture. Although only a quarter of all military service members actually 
serve in combat roles, it is important that all personnel understand and accept the combat mindset 
part of which, is the accepted use of violence as a means of warfare.  Unfortunately, through 
normalizing the use of sexualized phrases while simultaneously accepting violence, the result 
could be the acceptance of sexual violence (Hunter, 2007).  
 Objectification of people is the third aspect of military culture. On the first day of training 
newly enlisted military members learn to depersonalize their comrades by addressing them as 
recruit. By doing so, recruits are able to dehumanize people to make it easier to kill enemies. 
They also learn to dehumanize people through social distance, meaning learning to view the 
enemy as being beneath them in social status. Although the technique is used to dehumanize 
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enemies the technique can also be used in cases of sexual assault, the dehumanization of a victim 
makes it easier to commit the crime (Hunter, 2007).  
 The fourth aspect of military culture pertains to keeping up appearances. Military 
personnel are taught that the way they look in the eyes of the public and fellow military members 
is important. Recruits should avoid being an embarrassment to their fellow soldiers and the 
organization in general. Avoiding embarrassment is seen as more important than doing what is in 
the best interest of the organization. Avoiding embarrassment can cause service members to not 
report their sexual assault so they do not bring unwanted attention to their superior officer. The 
culture of the military, although not intentional, creates an environment conducive to sexual 
assaults (Hunter, 2007).   
 Other researchers have discussed characteristics of military culture. For example, 
Cushman discusses hyper- masculinity as a part of military culture. Women were not allowed in 
the military until the end of World War I, and as such the military was male dominated for 
decades (2012). The hyper- masculine culture of the military involves soldiers serving the role of 
protector, which is often seen as a male’s role. The military culture puts an emphasis on physical 
fitness. Strength is considered very important in the military. Emotional detachment is another 
trait emphasized by the military culture. With the inclusion of women and recent policy changes 
for homosexual men in the military, the hyper- masculine culture of the military is being 
threatened. This can lead to sexual assault in the military.  
 As previously mentioned, the military’s culture has experienced some recent changes by 
allowing women into combat roles and the dismantling of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) 
policy. Today, women participate in more traditionally male-dominated roles in the military such 
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as combat roles. Women have not always had the freedom to participate in all roles of the 
military. Women first served in the military during the second half of World War I 
predominately serving as nurses. When the draft ended in the 1970s, women were allowed into 
other roles in the military (Bumiller & Shanker, 2013). For example, it was during this time that 
women were first allowed into military academies. Despite being allowed in all branches of the 
military, women were not allowed to serve on combat missions (Cushman, 2012). Women could 
serve as communication specialists, truck drivers, military police officers and other supporting 
roles that were not on the front line (Engber, 2005). This policy only changed recently when 
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta lifted the military’s combat ban on women in 2013. Combat 
roles were seen as the most masculine position in the military. The inclusion of women in these 
positions was heavily debated (Bumiller & Shanker, 2013).  
As women have become more active in combat, sexual assaults have also made their way 
to the combat zone. LeardMann et al., assessed sexual assault and sexual harassment against 
women in combat deployment. Specifically the researchers examined the relationship between 
combat deployment and sexual stressors. Sexual stressors are defined in this study as sexual 
assault and sexual harassment. The researchers used the Millennium Cohort Study in order to 
obtain a large sample of female service members. According to the Millennium Cohort Study 
website the Millennium Cohort Study is the largest prospective health project in military history. 
It was designed to evaluate the long-term health effects of military service, including 
deployments (2013). 
LeardMann et al. used the Millennium Cohort Study initial questionnaires from 2001-
2003 and also the follow up questionnaires from 2004-2006. The study also used the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD) electronic military data to obtain deployment data. Demographic and 
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military-specific data were obtained from the DoD’s electronic personnel files. There were 
13,262 female participants in this study. The study found that women deployed in combat 
situations were more likely to experience both sexual harassment and sexual assault at the same 
time; however, the study found that the women were not more likely to experience only sexual 
assault and only sexual harassment in combat situations (LeardMann, et al., 2013).  
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) is another controversial policy introduced in the 1990’s by 
Bill Clinton (Burrelli, 2010). Before the DADT legislation, openly gay and lesbians were denied 
entry into the military based on their sexual orientation. Military recruitment forms blatantly 
asked the potential recruits if they were homosexual. This then led recruiters to deny the person 
entry if they answered yes. President Clinton wanted to end the exclusion of homosexuals in the 
military and signed into law Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, which took the question of sexual orientation 
off the military recruitment forms. Although the question was removed from the application 
process, it did not end the discrimination for homosexuals. While enlisted, homosexual men and 
women were denied the ability to openly express their sexuality in the military in fear that they 
would be prosecuted, harassed, or assaulted. They were also denied basic rights such as spousal 
benefits (Hunter, 2007). Don’t Ask Don’t Tell was repealed in 2011 by President Obama 
(Burrelli, 2010). Although this positive change allowed homosexuals to openly serve in the 
military and receive family benefits, they were not welcomed into the established military 
culture.  
 Homosexuals, like women, are a particularly vulnerable population in the military 
because they are seen as a threat to the masculinity of the military. Homosexuals face the threat 
of harassment, assault, and sexual assault in the military (Burrelli, 2010). Women who identify 
as homosexuals are often targeted by men for sexual assaults. Women who are labeled as 
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lesbians, but do not necessarily identify as lesbian, are targeted by men who wish to prove that 
these women are not lesbian (Hunter, 2007). 
The controversial group, Family Research Council, has taken a strong stance against the 
repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell because they believe if homosexual are able to openly serve in 
the military it will significantly increase the military sexual assault problem, specifically attacks 
on men by men. Leader of the group, Tony Perkins believes that homosexuals will be the main 
perpetrators of sexual assault. His rationale is that homosexuals (he specifically focuses on male 
homosexuals) are attracted to the same sex, therefore, there will be more targets. Perkins’ 
believes that because more males are sexually assaulted in the military than women, these 
offenders have more targets (McDonough, 2013). This is untrue, however, because although 
more men are sexually assaulted in the military women are disproportionately victimized (i.e. 
there are more men in the military). Perkins concern ignores the fact that the majority of sexual 
assaults are motivated by power and not sexual desire. His concern also does not take into 
account female homosexuals. Although his assertions are inaccurate his argument is worth 
mentioning because it is a historical concern and was a reason for keeping homosexuals out of 
the military previous to the 1990s (Hunter, 2007). 
The culture of the military as well as the recent policies allowing women in combat and 
allowing homosexuals to be openly gay in the military all have implications towards the sexual 
assault problem in the military. The following chapter will provide information on the military 





 Chapter 3: The Military Justice Process, the Problem with Reporting Sexual 
Assault, and the Chain of Command 
The Military Justice Process 
 The United States Constitution gives Congress the right to raise, support and regulate 
armed forces under Article 1 Section 8. The Supreme Court has also awarded Congress the 
power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Under this 
law Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ is the code of 
military criminal laws applicable to all U.S. military members (Mason, 2013).  
 The military justice system is different from that of the civilian criminal and civil justice 
system. The court in the military setting is called a court-martial (Department of Defense, 2012). 
Some of the laws that the courts enforce are similar to civilians while some are exclusively 
military laws. The process, however, differs significantly from the civilian system.  
The investigative process varies significantly from the civilian system. When a service 
member accuses a fellow service member of a crime they must report the crime through their 
chain of command. This means the victim reports to their immediate commander. The 
commander is then expected to conduct an inquiry. The investigation may also be conducted by 
other members of the command depending on the rank and severity of the charge. When all the 
evidence is gathered and the investigation is completed the immediate commander of the victim 
holds the discretion to dismiss the charges by taking no action, initiating administrative action, 
imposing non-judicial punishment, preferring charges, forward the case to a higher authority in 
order to prefer charges, or court martial the accused (Mason, 2013).  
Reporting Process and Problems 
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 Military sexual assault victims have two reporting options, a restricted report or an 
unrestricted report. A restricted report is used when a service member confidentially reports their 
sexual assault to a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), A SAPR (Sexual Assault 
Prevention and Response) Victim Advocate (VA), or healthcare personnel and does not want an 
official investigation. Restricted reports do not result in a criminal investigation and the victim’s 
chain of command is not notified. The victim’s commander is however notified that a report was 
filed, but not who reported the assault or the identity of the offender. Therefore, the victim’s 
assailant is not punished in this circumstance due to this confidentiality. The benefit to 
unrestricted reporting is the victim is able to obtain counseling and medical treatment without the 
fear that comes from reporting such as retaliation (Rape Abuse and Incest National Network, 
2009). 
 An unrestricted report is used when the victim wants to pursue an official investigation. 
A victim can make a report to a SARC, victim advocate, healthcare personnel, a member of the 
chain-of-command, law enforcement, legal personnel, or a chaplain. Once the report is made it is 
reported to the victim’s chain of command (Rape Abuse and Incest National Network, 2009). 
 There are both positive and negative consequences for restricted and unrestricted 
reporting of sexual assault in the military. The anonymity of unrestricted reporting provides 
victims with the ability to obtain the appropriate medical care and mental health treatment 
without having to go through the chain of command. Restricted reporting, on the other hand, 
allows the perpetrator to be criminally charged in court-martial. This research focuses on 
unrestricted reporting specifically focusing on how the chain of command affects the reporting of 
sexual assaults affecting the pervasiveness of sexual assault in the military.  
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Chain of Command 
 The chain of command is a personnel organization system that connects all military 
personnel together according to a specific level of achievement, or rank. The chain of command 
is an organizational structure through which orders are passed from the top down. The chain of 
command is similar in all branches of the military but does vary slightly in terms of names of 
ranks. The highest rank in all military branches is the President of the United States whereas the 
lowest rank is a recruit (Service Women's Action Network, 2012).  
 When crimes occur in the military they are to be reported through the chain of command. 
Depending on where in the chain of command a soldier is located they are to report the crime to 
their superior officer (i.e. their commanding officer). Next, that superior officer is to order a full 
investigation into the crime (Mason, 2013). The commander has a lot of power and discretion in 
criminal cases. The commander decides whether to pursue the case or not. Also the commander 
decides whether to approve charges for trial, select the jury, and negotiate plea deals. After the 
court martial is over the commander still has the power to overturn guilty verdicts or reduce 
recommended sentences (Everett, 1972). 
 It is because of the overwhelming power that the commander possesses during the 
investigation process and the courts martial process that the chain of command has been 
criticized for contributing to the sexual assault problem. Many victims and military personnel 
have come out against the use of the chain of command in the sexual assault reporting process. 
The quotes that follow demonstrate the attitudes toward the effectiveness of the chain of 
command in the reporting process.  
“Having served in leadership positions in the US Army, I have concluded that if military 
leadership hasn’t fixed the problem in my lifetime, it’s not going to be fixed without a 
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change to the status quo. The imbalance of power and authority held by commanders in 
dealing with sexual assaults must be corrected. There has to be independent oversight 
over what is happening in these cases. Simply put, we must remove the conflicts of 
interest in the current system…The system in which a commander can sweep his own 
crime or the crime of a decorated soldier or friend under the rug, protects the guilty and 
protects serial predators. And it harms military readiness…Until leadership is held 
accountable, this won’t be corrected. To hold leadership accountable means there must be 
independence and transparency in the system. Permitting professionally trained 
prosecutors rather than commanding officers to decide whether to take sexual assault 
cases to trial is measured first step toward such accountability…I have no doubt that 
command climate, unit cohesion and readiness will be improved by (these) changes” 
(Gillibrand, 2013, para. 9). 
- Lt. General (Ret.) Claudia Kennedy (Gillibrand, 2013).  
“Having someone within your direct chain of command handling the case, it just doesn`t 
make sense. It`s like your brother raping you and having your dad decide the case” 
(Gillibrand, 2013, para. 34). 
-Sarah Plummer, Victim of Sexual Assault, U.S. Marine Corps (Gillibrand, 2013). 
“As a former Commanding Officer and Convening Authority, I completely understand 
the services’ insistence that commanders must retain their authority to dispose of charges 
of sexual assault. However, as an advocate for military women– and men – it is crystal 
clear to me that too many commanders have betrayed the trust placed in them by their 
subordinates, their services and their fellow citizens because they have not used this 
authority properly. I have, therefore, come to the reluctant conclusion that that authority 
must be removed from the chain of command and placed in the hands of trained military 
prosecutors who can serve as unbiased, professional experts on the disposition of sexual 
assaults and other felony cases. This is critical to ending sexual assault in the military” 
(Gillibrand, 2013, para.17).  











Chapter 4: Methods 
This research focuses on the reporting of sexual assault in the military. Specifically this 
research focuses on how the chain of command and reporting structure contribute to both the 
pervasiveness of sexual assault and obstruction of the victim’s ability to report sexual assault. 
The goal of this study is to better understand the issues of sexual assault in the military 
specifically as they pertain to the research question and hypothesis.   
 This research uses a case study method to examine three case studies involving sexual 
assault in the military. The case studies span across 13 years. This allows for the evaluation of 
the military’s response to sexual assault and how it has evolved.  
 The following research question and hypothesis will determine the type of qualitative and 
quantitative data used Does the sexual assault reporting process contribute to the pervasiveness 
of sexual assault in the military? This study examines whether the prevalence of sexual assault in 
the military results from the way sexual assaults are handled in the chain of command. The 
hypothesis of this study is that the pervasiveness of sexual assault in the military is partially the 
result of the formal processes through which sexual assaults are handled by the chain of 
command.  This study also assesses whether the existing models in the military for processing 
sexual assault complaints are sufficient in determining guilt, innocence and when appropriate, 
the adequate punishment.  
 Using secondary data, this study will seek to answer the stated questions above.  The data 
includes congressional records from the Aberdeen, Tailhook and Air Force Academy scandals 
(discussed in the following chapter), Congressional records of military sexual assault, 
Department of Defense and Inspector General Reports. Documentation including newspaper 
articles relating to the three cases studies and military sexual assault in general; official crime 
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data from the Department of Defense SAPR annual reports 2004-2012; and finally secondary 
interviews of victims, military personnel and offenders from books, newspaper, official reports, 
congressional records, and congressional hearings. The following provides and in depth 
discussion of these methods.  
Congressional Records and Hearings 
 The purpose of congressional hearings is for congress to hear about specific issues that 
may have policy implications. These hearings can influence legislation. According to the Library 
of Congress, “Testimony is received from members of Congress, officials of the executive 
branch, policy experts, interest groups and sometimes the general public on legislative proposals, 
the functioning of government programs, subjects of controversy, and matters under 
investigation” (Library of Congress, 2010, para. 1). Congressional hearings were obtained, for 
this study, from the Government Printing Office’s website. 
Congressional Records  
 Congressional records were obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Congressional records are written accounts of verbal remarks said by senators and 
representatives on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives.  
Official Military Reports  
 Official military reports will include the Department of Defense Inspector General’s final 
report on the investigation of Tailhook. The report was obtained from the University of 
Maryland’s website. The final report was broken up into two parts. Both reports are used in this 
study. The first report from September 1992 focuses on the Navy Inspector General’s initial 
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investigation and any inconsistencies that were found during the course of the DoD Inspector 
General’s investigation. The second report from February 1993 focuses on the actual incidents 
that occurred during the Tailhook Symposium September 8-12, 1991. Overall, the purpose of 
these reports was to inform Congress, the Navy, and the public of the results of the Tailhook 
investigation.  
 The Committee on National Securities report on the Aberdeen Sexual Assault Scandal 
was obtained from the U.S. House of Representatives Document Repository. The purpose of this 
report was for Senate members to discuss and review the sexual assaults that took place at 
Aberdeen Proving ground and review the Army’s investigation and come up with solutions to the 
problem.  
The 2003 hearings before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate 
were obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office. These hearings provide an in depth 
analysis of the 2003 Air Force Academy Sexual Assault Scandal. The chain of command, 
military culture, and reporting mechanisms are thoroughly examined.  
The Office of the Inspector for the Department of Defense’s report summary entitled 
Evaluation of Sexual Assault, Reprisal, and Related Leadership Challenges at the United States 
Air Force Academy was also used. The purpose of the report is to inform Members of Congress; 
the Secretaries of Defense and Air Force; other senior DoD and Air Force leaders/managers on 
the problems facing the Air Force after the 2003 Air Force sexual assault scandal. The report was 
obtained from the Department of Defense’s website.  
Furthermore, this research used the Report of the Panel to review Sexual Misconduct 
Allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy from September 2003. This report was an 
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independent investigation of the sexual assault problem at U.S. Air Force Academies. The 
purpose of this report was to provide a non-biased view of the problem of sexual assault in U.S. 
Air Force Academies. These problems include reporting issues, leadership issues, counseling 
issues, and issues surrounding women in the military.    
Written Documentation 
 Written documentation from newspapers was used to provide background information on 
the three case studies being examined. Newspapers were used to supplement the official military 
reports, congressional reports, and books to ensure there was enough data to analyze the 
problem.   
Secondary Interviews  
 Secondary interviews were obtained from news articles, department of defense reports 
and congressional records. These secondary interviews informed this research by providing 
accounts by the victims of the sexual assault problem in the military. The secondary interviews 
provided much needed insight on how the chain of command influences the sexual assault 
problem within the military.  
How the data will be assessed 
This study assesses each type of data uniformly. From the data mentioned above, basic 
information about each case study will be collected. This basic information includes that date(s) 
of the incident(s), the key players involved, the number of victims, any victims who were 
identified, any offenders who were named and what they were charged with. The data provides a 
basic understanding of the case study.  
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The command problems presented in each individual case study are then assessed. 
Command problems involve anyone in the chain of command who did not take appropriate 
action, participated in, or perpetuated sexual assault or sexual harassment in each case study. 
This data will aid in this research by confirming or denying the hypothesis. If the chain of 
command is found to be at fault in the case studies for part of the sexual assault problem the 
hypothesis will be confirmed. If it is not at fault it will be disproven. 
The response of each branch of the military in relation to each case study is also 
examined. The response includes the time frame each branch took to investigate. For example, 
was the investigation launched immediately after the incident or was it delayed. Also the 
response includes the effectiveness of the investigation. For example, was the investigation 
thorough or were their flaws. The response in each case study will inform the discussion on 
whether there has been any improvement in the response to sexual assault. The response is 
important to the assessment of the chain of command because it is the most senior of personnel 
who conduct the investigations and decide upon the correct response.  
After evaluating the response in each case study the changes in policy since the incident 
(case study) occurred were then evaluated. This set of data is different from the response because 
these are long term changes. They may not have been enacted immediately after the incident 
occurred. These changes include any policies or procedures put in place in order to prevent any 
future problems from occurring. Like the response data, this data will be important in comparing 
the effectiveness of the changes across all three case studies.  
Problems prior to the incidents in each case study are assessed. These problems include 
any prior incidents of sexual assault or harassment. This also involves any knowledge that the 
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branch of military might have had a problem with sexual assault or harassment. This is important 
to evaluate because it shows a lack of response by the chain of command to adequately control 
the problems in its command. It also shows a lack of effective leadership.  
Finally, victim’s stories and quotes are extracted from the data. These stories come from 
anyone who was a victim of a sexual assault in each of the three case studies. Victim’s stories 
will be used in order to gain a first-hand account of the incidents. Specifically the researcher is 
looking for any admission that the chain of command may have affected reporting the sexual 
assault or sexual harassment. Also extracted are stories from witnesses or offenders. These will 
show attitudes towards the incidents. They will also inform the discussion on chain of command 
problems in reporting sexual assault.  
The limitations in each set of data include the lack of data. Congressional hearings were 
not available for all of the case studies. Secondary interviews with victims, offenders, or 
witnesses were not always available due to the privacy of the victims, offenders, witnesses and 
also the military in general. Inspector General reports were not available for two of the case 
studies due to availability. The data was also collected by only one coder allowing for the 





Chapter 5: Case Studies 
Case Study 1: Tailhook  
 Tailhook describes itself as an “independent, fraternal, nonprofit organization 
internationally recognized as the premier supporter of the aircraft carrier and other sea-based 
aviation” (Tailhook Association, 2013, para.1). The first Tailhook Symposium, often called 
reunions, took place in 1956 in Tijuana, Mexico. These conferences involve both naval and 
marine aviators and offer panels and talks on various topics in aviation. The symposium was 




 annual Tailhook Symposium took place in Las Vegas, Nevada from September 
8- 12, 1991. In the after-hours of the conference almost 100 sexual assaults took place (Ogden, 
2009). Each aviation squadron (unit) had their own suite on the third floor of the conference 
hotel. There were over 20 suites in total. The aviators used the suites for social events in addition 
to partying and drinking. In total, over $35,000 was spent on alcohol during the weekend of the 
symposium (Ogden, 2009). With this high concentration of military personnel in such a confined 
area along with the amount of money spent on alcohol the behavior of the personnel went from 
social to criminal. The following is a description of the criminal behavior that took place at 
Tailhook.  
The Gauntlet 
 During the weekend at the symposium many of the men formed the gauntlet. The 
gauntlet refers to an event when aviators would line up on either side of the third floor of the 
conference hotel. The men would wait for women exiting the elevator to walk by in order to get 
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to their rooms on the third floor. The men would then grope, pinch, or grab the women. There 
were some women who knowingly entered the gauntlet however others were unsuspecting 
victims.  
 Captain Ludwig described the gauntlet as the most serious of the criminal behavior that 
occurred at Tailhook. Captain Ludwig said the following about  the gauntlet:“ I have five 
separate reports of young ladies, several of whom had nothing to do with Tailhook, who were 
verbally abused, had drinks thrown on them, were physically abused and were sexually molested. 
Most distressing was the fact an underage young lady was severely intoxicated and had her 
clothing removed by members of the Gauntlet” (McMichael, 1997, p.50). 
 Over 100 U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aviation officers allegedly assaulted 83 
women and seven men. One of these women was Lt. Paula Coughlin, an aide to rear admiral 
John B. Snyder of the U.S. Navy. Coughlin entered the gauntlet unknowingly on September 7, 
1991. Coughlin got off the elevator to the third floor. She was grabbed by three men who groped 
and pulled her underwear off. She managed to escape her attackers.  
Coughlin reported this incident to her superior on September 8, 1991, the day after her 
assault. She approached Snyder again two weeks later. By September 28
th
 nothing was done 
about her allegation so she sent her own letter to Rear Admiral Snyder’s superior Vice Admiral 
Richard Dunleavy. A criminal investigation was ordered upon Vice Admiral Dunleavy receiving 
her letter on October 10, 1991. A month had lapsed between Coughlin first reporting of the 
incident on September 8,1991 and the investigation on October 10,1991 (Ogden, 2009). 
Although the Gauntlet is regarded as the most notorious incident at Tailhook there were other 
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incidents of impropriety at Tailhook as well. The following is a discussion of those activities 
which include prostitution and public sex, indecent exposure, “sharking”, and “zapping”.  
Prostitution  
 During the Tailhook convention several of the personnel occupying suites at the 
conference hotel hired strippers. The strippers were paid by several military personnel for sex. 
Prostitution violates article 138- 34 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on patronizing a 
prostitute. The article reads “2) Patronizing a Prostitute. (a) That the accused had sexual 
intercourse with another person not the accused's spouse; (b) That the accused compelled, 
induced, enticed, or procured such person to engage in an act of sexual intercourse in exchange 
for money or other compensation” (Vander Schaff, 1993, para.5). 
Indecent Exposure 
 There were several types of indecent exposure during the symposium. There were many 
reports of men at the convention exposing themselves to women. Also, men walked around with 
their testicles exposed and wait for someone to notice. One woman reported seeing this type of 
behavior occur in front of a Navy Captain. The captain allegedly did nothing about the behavior.  
The culture of the military encouraged such behavior. As a matter of fact, there were several 
souvenir shirts available that made reference to these inappropriate behaviors. One shirt said 
“Women are Property” and another read “If you got em hang em’” (Vander Schaff, 1993).  
“Sharking” 
 Sharking is a term used by the marine and naval aviators to describe the act of biting 
either a male or female on their buttocks. This behavior most often occurred in the suites 
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occupied by aviation personnel on the third floor. Eight women and one man reported that they 
were bitten without their consent on the third floor. Two of these individuals suffered bruises to 
the buttocks as well as other areas including ears, ankles and neck. One individual had to seek 
medical attention (Vander Schaff, 1993).  
“Zapping” 
 Zapping is another term used by officers to describe the action of placing stickers 
identifying a specific aviation squadron on female body parts.  There were incidents of voluntary 
as well as involuntary zapping. Three women, including a female commander, reported being 
zapped on their breast and genitals while walking through a hallway involuntarily. One of the 
women had her skirt forcefully pulled up and her blouse ripped. Stickers were then placed on her 
crotch and breasts (Vander Schaff, 1993).  
As demonstrated, there were several incidents of sexual assault that occurred at the 1991 
Tailhook Symposium, the most notorious being the Gauntlet. Although many of the officers and 
command staff deny the existence of the Gauntlet there are several others who confirm that it 
indeed occurred. There are reports that command staff was present during some of the incidents 
and some command staff actually reported being victims of the Gauntlet. The next section 
discusses the investigation that followed the sexual assaults at the 1991 Tailhook symposium.  
Investigation 
 Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III cut all ties to the association on October 
31, 1991. This came about 3 weeks after the Secretary learned of the sexual assaults at Tailhook. 
He also ordered the Naval Inspector General, Rear Admiral George Davis, to conduct a full 
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investigation using the Naval Investigative Service (NIS). This final report from this 
investigation was released on April 30, 1992 (Vander Schaff, 1992).  
 Navy Judge Advocate General, Barbara Pope met with Navy Secretary H. Lawrence 
Garrett III to inform him that congress; and the general public was unhappy with the 
investigation. Navy Judge Advocate General Pope argued that the Naval Investigative Service 
report did not produce enough names of those who participated in the sexual assaults at Tailhook 
(Ogden, 2009). After recognizing that the integrity of the Navy was being questioned by 
Congress and the public, Secretary of the Navy Garrett asked the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Inspector General Derek Vander Schaaf to conduct an independent investigation into Tailhook 
(Vander Schaff, 1992). There were two separate reports released by the DoD Inspector General 
Vander Schaaf. 
Department of Defense Inspector General Report 
 In the first report, DoD Inspector General Vander Schaaf found two weaknesses in the 
Navy’s original investigation. First, Navy Inspector General George Davis did not interview 
senior officers present at Tailhook. DoD Inspector General Vander Schaaf saw this as a 
weakness because he felt the officers should have been interviewed to determine if they had 
witnessed any of the misconduct that had occurred. The second weakness was the Naval 
Inspector General Davis’ failure to expand the scope of the investigation to other sexual assaults 
and incidences when reports of indecent exposure and conduct unbecoming of an officer were 
reported during interviews (Vander Schaff, 1992).  
 The Naval Investigative Services (NIS) interviewed both the naval and marine attendees 
at Tailhook. They found that most of these attendees did not understand why the sexual assaults 
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at Tailhook were a problem. They also found that the men had no understanding of how the 
actions that took place during Tailhook fostered an atmosphere of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault (Vander Schaff, 1992). One reason the attendees may not have understood the 
seriousness of their action is that these actions were condoned by the chain of command. For 
example Naval Inspector General Davis found the following,  
“The activities which took place in the corridor and the suites if not tacitly approved were 
allowed to continue by the leadership of the aviation community and the Tailhook Association. 
Further the conduct in the corridor was merely reflective of the atmosphere that was created by 
the activities in a number of the suites” (Vander Schaff, 1992, Para 36). 
 The DoD Inspector General Vander Schaaf also concluded that the deficiencies in the 
initial navy investigations were due to the collaborative management failures and personal 
failures on the part of the Secretary of the Navy Garrett, the Navy IG Davis and the Commander 
of the NIS Williams. It was concluded that these failures were a result of Navy leaders protecting 
themselves from the criticisms of Tailhook.  
 The Navy Inspector General Davis told the DoD Inspector General that the senior 
leadership of the Navy acknowledged the role they played in Tailhook. The Navy Inspector 
General Davis said,  
“...once we determined we had a cultural problem then it was our contention in that group 
around the table, the Under and all these people, that the corporate "we" had allowed this 
to take place. And to interview squadron [commanding officers], to ask them why they 
allowed that to happen didn't make any difference because the whole system allowed it to 
happen. And frankly, I think a Navy captain who had seen that over four or five years, 
had seen the Rhino room with a dildo hanging on the wall, is not going to walk in there in 
1991 and change anything (Vander Schaff, 1992, Para 38).  
  
 What this quote indicates is that the senior leadership took responsibility for everything 
that took place at Tailhook because it was a long standing problem. Although what the quote also 
indicates is that senior leadership did not think that individual officers in the chain of command 




 The DoD’s Investigator General Vander Schaaf identified personal failures on the part of 
the following senior leadership in the Navy; Secretary of the Navy Garett and Naval Inspector 
General Davis and the entire Naval Investigative Service.  It is made clear in the DoD’s 
Investigator General’s report that there were significant failures at all levels within the Navy 
chain of command. This includes the commanders in the chain of command who failed to 
adequately handle reports of sexual assault or discipline the misconduct that took place in their 
presence. These failures continued through the ranks all the way up to the Secretary of the Navy.  
(Vander Schaff, 1992).  
Punishment 
 A total of 119 Navy and 21 Marine Corps officers received disciplinary action in 1992 
(Ogden, 2009). The officers were charged with the following offenses, indecent assault, indecent 
exposure, conduct unbecoming an officer or failure to act in a proper leadership capacity. Half 
of the cases were dropped due to lack of evidence. The rest of the cases received non-judicial 
punishments. These non-judicial punishments included fines and career penalties. None of the 
officers were charged with any type of sexual assault (e.g. stripped of rank, inability to move up 
in rank) (McMichael, 1997). Only six of the officers were referred to court martial (Ogden, 
2009).  
The two lieutenants accused of sexually assaulting the victim, Lieutenant Paula Coughlin 
had their cases dismissed due to lack of evidence. However, less serious offenses were pursued 
for instance one lieutenant was found guilty of shaving women’s legs at Tailhook and received a 
letter of reprimand and a 1,000 dollar fine. The final three officers being court martialed for 
conduct unbecoming of an officer argued that they were being held accountable for something 
Rear Admiral Frank Kelso did. They claimed that because Rear Admiral Kelso was at Tailhook 
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and witnessed similar behavior, he should be held responsible and not them, because Rear 
Admiral Kelso was a higher ranking officer. The court agreed and the rest of the cases relating to 
Tailhook were dropped (Ogden, 2009).  
The highest ranking commissioned officers to receive sanctions were Vice Admiral 
Dunleavy, Rear Admiral Flagg, and Rear Admiral Mixson. Vice Admiral Dunleavy was the most 
senior naval official at Tailhook. Vice Admiral Dunleavy admitted in a statement to the DoD 
Inspector General Davis that he knew about the activities that took place in the Gauntlet, as well 
as the prostitution, but did nothing to stop it. He said in the same statement that he should be 
fired (Vander Schaff, 1992).  
Rear Admiral Flagg was cited for being aware of previous crude behavior at Tailhook 
conventions, as well as failing to act when a woman was sexually assaulted during the 1991 
session. Rear Admiral Mixson knew of improprieties at past Tailhook conventions, but did 
nothing to prevent this behavior from occurring in the future (Lewis, 1993). 
All three officers received a letter of censure. A letter of censure is a letter of reprimand 
that becomes a part of the officer’s record and prevents the officer from advancing in rank. These 
letters are considered career ending. For example, Vice Admiral Dunleavy was demoted from a 
three-star rank to a two-star rank after his censure letter and retired in the summer of 1992. The 
reduction in rank cost him 100,000 dollars over the course of his retirement (Lewis, 1993).  
The most senior leadership (see Appendix A Table 2: Military Ranks) in the Navy were 
also sanctioned. Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garett resigned following the Tailhook 
scandal after being asked by then President George H. Bush. Naval Inspector General Davis was 
reassigned after the DoD Inspector General Vander Schaaf found flaws in Davis’ investigation. 
Rear Admiral Frank Kelso received a letter of caution. A letter of caution is a warning that does 
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not go on an officer’s record. Rear Admiral Kelso retired two years after Tailhook and did not 
face any punishment although he was said to be present during many of the inappropriate 
activities that took place (Frontline, 1993). The following section identifies how the chain of 
command failed in Paula Coughlin’s case at Tailhook and then will provide a general description 
of how the chain of command failed as a whole. 
Command Problems with the Paula Coughlin Case  
 As previously mentioned, Lieutenant Paula Coughlin attended the 1991 Tailhook 
convention with Admiral John Snyder. Coughlin was an Admirals Aide meaning she was an 
assistant to an Admiral. Lieutenant Coughlin was one of the victims sexually assaulted in the 
gauntlet at Tailhook (Ogden, 2009). She describes her attack on September 7, 1991: 
"The man with the dark complexion moved in immediately behind me with his body  
pressed against mine. He was bumping me, pushing me forward down the passageway 
where the group on either side was pinching and then pulling at my clothing. The man 
then put both his hands down the front of my tank top and inside my bra where he 
grabbed my breasts. I dropped to a forward crouch position and placed my hands on the 
wrists of my attacker in an attempt to remove his hands... I sank my teeth into the fleshy 
part of the man's left forearm, biting hard. I thought I drew blood... I then turned and bit 
the man on the right hand at the area between the base of the thumb and base of the index 
finger." The man removed his hands, and another individual "reached up under my skirt 
and grabbed the crotch of my panties. I kicked one of my attackers ... I felt as though the 
group was trying to rape me. I was terrified and had no idea what was going to happen 
next” (Vander Schaff, 1993, p.F-27). 
  
 On September 8,
 
1991, the morning after her attack Lieutenant Coughlin reported her 
assault to her superior Rear Admiral John Snyder. Rear Admiral Snyder promised to report the 
attack however he did not report it to his superior or launch an investigation. Lieutenant 
Coughlin inquired again about her report to Rear Admiral Snyder two weeks later but again 
nothing came of it. Lieutenant Coughlin instead sent a letter on September 28th to Rear Admiral 
Snyder’s superior Vice Admiral Dunleavy who upon receiving the letter on October 10, 1991, 
ordered a criminal investigation into Coughlin’s attack (Ogden, 2009).The month that passed 
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between the initial report and subsequent investigation proved to be detrimental in the 
investigation of Coughlin’s sexual assault. Coughlin’s situation proved there was a disconnect 
between reporting a sexual assault and when the chain of command addresses the report. 
Lieutenant Coughlin took the necessary steps to report her sexual assault to her superior.  Her 
superior officer Rear Admiral Snyder ignored her report which delayed the investigation and 
prevented justice in Lieutenant Coughlin’s case.   
Despite the sexual assaults at Tailhook coming as a surprise to people across the nation, it 
was not the first time there were reports of sexual assault at the Tailhoook symposium. In his 
letter to the Tailhook representative before the Tailhook convention in 1991, Captain Ludwig 
discusses issues with underage drinking, the Gauntlet, damage to hotel suites and common areas, 
and lewd and lascivious behavior. He expressed concern that this behavior would occur at 
Tailhook 1991. What was clear from this letter was that sexual misconduct at Tailhook was not 
new. When many of the officers were interviewed about their behavior after Tailhook, they 
explained the behavior was accepted. Officers described it as a “tradition” (Ludwig, 1991).  
 As mentioned in the previous section Rear Admiral Flagg and Mixson were both 
reprimanded for having previous knowledge of sexual assaults and inappropriate behavior at 
previous Tailhook Symposiums. This provides further evidence that top naval officials were 
aware of the past improprieties at Tailhook and did nothing to prevent them at the 1991 Tailhook 
conference.  
 Paula Coughlin’s case was significantly delayed due to the inaction of her superior 
officer. Her attackers were subsequently let go due to insufficient evidence, evidence that could 
have been collected if her report was taken seriously in the first place.  
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 Even after Tailhook was over there continued to be problems. Inspector General Davis 
and the Naval Investigative Service failed to complete an adequate investigation and Inspector 
General Davis was reassigned. The Department of Defense Inspector General then had to 
complete an independent investigation.  
Policies and Procedures Post-Tailhook 
 After Tailhook, the navy mandated that any officer who was up for promotion had to 
answer the question, “Did you or anyone in your command attend the Tailhook conference in 
1991?” If the officer answered yes his promotion would be set aside for a special evaluation. 
Consequently officers attending Tailhook in 1991 had a more difficult time advancing in rank 
(Frontline, 1993).  
 In 1992, the Naval Investigative Service changed its name to the National Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS). The new Naval Inspector General David Bennett was the first 
civilian Navy Inspector General. Although it is unclear whether these events were a direct result 
of the failure of the Tailhook investigation, they are notable. One week after the Department of 
Defense Inspector General Vander Schaaf released his report on Tailhook women were allowed 









Case Study 2: Aberdeen 
 Aberdeen Proving Ground’s Ordnance Center (APG) is located in Maryland. After 
recruits complete basic combat training they are sent to train for their specific Army job. Those 
who are being trained for weapons and system maintenance are sent to APG which is home to 
the Ordinance Mechanical Maintenance School (Powers, 2002).  In September 1996, a female 
trainee at the Aberdeen Proving Ground’s Ordnance Center complained to her superior about 
being sexually harassed. Several other reports followed. By the beginning of November 1996, 
thirty-four women reported being victims of rape, sexual assault or sexual harassment at 
Aberdeen. On November 6, 1996 (See Aberdeen Timeline in Appendix A) the Army set up a 
hotline for victims of sexual abuse which received over 6,000 calls in November alone. The calls 
not only involved sexual assault and harassment allegations from Aberdeen, but several other 
army bases throughout the country These reports from other army bases forced the Army to 
expand its investigation beyond Aberdeen (Shadley, 2013). The following are details of the 
investigation of the incidents of sexual assault and harassment at APG.  
Investigation 
 As previously mentioned, after the first report of sexual harassment from a female recruit, 
the army launched a full out investigation into Aberdeen. A hotline was set up to handle sexual 
assault reports on November 6, 1991 after there were over 30 reports of sexual assault and 
harassment. The Army interviewed more than 1,000 women who trained at Aberdeen from 1995-
1996 (West, 1997).  
 In response to the sexual assaults at Aberdeen and the other Army bases, Secretary of the 
Army Togo West set up The Secretary of the Army’s Senior Review Panel on November 21, 
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1996 (See Aberdeen Timeline in Appendix A). The review panel consisted of 40 military and 
civilian personnel. The purpose of the review panel was to review the Army’s policies on sexual 
harassment and sexual assault. The review panel also examined how the chain of command 
handled sexual assault claims and made recommendations for the future policies on sexual 
harassment in the Army (West, 1997). 
 During the course of the investigation, investigators interviewed 7,401 soldiers and 808 
army leaders. An additional 1,007 civilian employees took part in focus groups. There were also 
22,952 soldiers who filled out surveys (Shadley, 2013). Investigators found that in the surveys, 
focus groups, and interviews that something called “The Game” was repeatedly mentioned. 
Investigators discovered that three drill sergeants, Captain Derrick Robertson (CAPT), Sergeant 
Delmar Simpson (SGT) and Sergeant First Class Tony Cross (SFC) created this “Game”. “The 
Game” or “GAM A La Military” involved drill sergeants seeing how many army trainees they 
could get to sleep with them.  In order to win the game each drill sergeant kept a list of their 
sexual activities, which ever drill sergeant had the most names would win. It is unclear whether 
there was a tangible prize or it was simply a game for bragging rights (Shadley, 2013). A 21 year 
old private, who was raped by a drill sergeant at Aberdeen and did not immediately report her 
rape, said the following when asked why she did not initially report, “''I was ashamed. . . . I 
didn't want to be on his list either” (Sciolino, 1997c, para.4). This list is referring to the lists kept 
by drill sergeants while participating in “The Game”.  
Charges 
The defendants that received jail time were drill sergeants Captain Derrick Robertson, 
Sergeant Delmar Simpson, Sergeant 1
st
 Class Tony Cross and Nathanial Beech. Captain Derrick 
34 
 
Robertson faced charges of adultery, rape, indecent assault, obstruction of justice, consensual 
sodomy, conduct unbecoming an officer and dereliction of duty. Sergeant 1
st
 Class Tony Cross 
faced 13 counts of misconduct including adultery and sodomy against 4 women. Sergeant 
Delmar Simpson faced 19 counts of rape against 6 women.  Nathanial Beech was initially 
charged with rape but the charge was dropped to adultery (CNN, 1996).  
 Captain Derrick Robertson agreed to a plea deal. He plead guilty on March 20, 1997 (see 
Aberdeen Timeline in Appendix A) to having consensual sex with a female trainee (although the 
female trainee said it was not consensual), as well as, consensual sodomy, conduct unbecoming 
an officer and dereliction of duty. He was dismissed from the Army and sentenced to three 
months in prison (Powers, 2002). Sergeant 1
st
 Class Tony Cross was convicted on 13 counts of 
adultery and sodomy involving four women on April 11, 1997. The charges included adultery 
and sodomy (Sciolino, 1997c).   
 During Sergeant Simpson’s trial on April 15, 1997 several victims testified against him. 
One 21 year old former trainee from Alabama testified that Simpson called her into his office to 
reprimand her for returning to bed from the bathroom after bed check. She said Sergeant 
Simpson tried to kiss her and she denied him. He then forcibly put her on the couch in his office. 
He placed his hand over her mouth, pulled down her shorts and panties and raped her. The 21 
year- old trainee said, “I asked him to stop, to please stop. I was crying. He was lying on top of 
me. There wasn’t a whole lot I could do” (Sciolino, 1997c, para. 11)  
Another victim of Sergeant Simpson, a 22 year- old former trainee described her rape to 
the court. She said after Sergeant Simpson disciplined her for touching his drill sergeant’s hat, “I 
went up to his office and I told him exactly what I thought. The door was open and I walked in 
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and I said, ‘Hey look, I don’t appreciate what you’re doing” (Sciolino, 1997c, para.18). Sergeant 
Simpson laughed at her. He threw her on the couch and pinned her hands above her head. He 
then raped her (Sciolino, 1997b).   
 Sergeant Delmar Simpson was convicted of 18 counts of rape against six females. He 
was acquitted on only one count of rape because the victim said she lead him to believe she 
wanted to have sex with him (Spinner, 1997). Simpson was sentenced to 25 years in military 
prison for his crimes (Sciolino, 1997b). These examples illustrate how the command staff 
contributed directly to sexual assault. The next section discusses how the chain of command also 
obstructed the reporting process.  
 In total, including the drill sergeants charged above, one soldier was charged with rape, 
and the remaining eleven were charged with sexual misconduct charges which included sodomy, 
adultery, and having consensual sex with a trainee. Six of the twelve soldiers were court 
martialed but only four were charged and given jail time, the six remaining cases of the twelve 
were resolved by other means such as discharges or administrative proceedings (Shenon, 1997). 
Obstruction of Reporting by the Chain of Command   
 After drill sergeants from APG were arraigned on charges of sexual assault in December 
1996, The Army’s Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, blamed the chain of command at 
Aberdeen for the incidents of sexual assault. During a press conference in Washington Reimer 
said, “The Army operates under the premise that the chain of command must do its job. We 
cannot have abuses in the chain of command and expect people to follow us. There's a 
responsibility in the chain of command, and when that responsibility is abused, that bothers me, 
big time” (Schmitt, 1996, para.7). What Reimer was referring to were the drill sergeants who 
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were involved in sexual misconduct. These drill sergeants are a part of the chain of command. 
They are the superiors that the trainees are expected to report their crimes to. They are the 
superiors that are supposed to be enforcing the law (Shenon, 1997).  
 The main problem with Aberdeen was the reporting structure for sexual assaults. Victims 
were expected to report their assaults to their superiors however their attackers were their 
superiors. This created a conflict of interest and led to a lack of reporting. It also led the chain of 
command to not file reports of rape as they would be criminally implicating themselves.   
Policies and Procedures Post Aberdeen 
After Aberdeen regulations were put in place in order to prevent future sexual assaults. 
For example, trainees were not allowed to visit a drill sergeant unless accompanied by another 
soldier. Drill sergeants and trainees were advised that the regulation was in their best interest 
(Hunter- Gault, 1996). To help eliminate the relaxed environment at Aberdeen (as reported by 
trainees) which was conducive to sexual assaults commanders distributed fewer weekend passes. 
Trainees instead received more military training. The relationship between trainees and drill 
sergeants became stricter (Spinner, 1997). 
Also, the Army has assigned additional officers to training units so that commanders can 
spend more time with soldiers. Another policy change to help remove the chain of command 
from sexual assault reporting was adding more chaplains. Chaplains provide recruits with an 
alternative source of reporting sexual assaults.  Furthermore a new training class on sexual 
assault was added to the curriculum for new recruits. Within 24 hours the recruits were educated 




Case Study 3: Air Force Academy Sexual Assault  
 On January 2, 2003 the Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche, Senator Wayne 
Allard of Colorado, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, and media representatives 
received an email from someone using the pseudonym Renee Trundle. The email claimed there 
was widespread sexual assault in the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado 
(Schmitz, 2004-a).  
Investigation 
 After reading the anonymous email the Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche 
directed the General Counsel of the Air Force to establish a group to review cadet’s complaints 
about sexual assault that occurred at the Air Force Academy in Colorado. The complaints range 
from January 1993 to January 2002. Secretary Roche also tasked the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz to conduct and independent investigation of the Air 
Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) investigation of sexual assault cases and to 
investigate cadet complaints concerning the alleged mishandling of sexual assault cases. These 
complaints ranged from January 1993 to February 2003 (Schmitz, 2004 a). Former Florida 
Congresswoman Tillie K. Fowler, at the direction of the Department of Defense and Congress, 
conducted an independent review of the sexual assault problem at the Air Force Academy 
(Fowler, 2003). The following is a description of the findings from these three groups. 
 A working group was set up by Secretary Roche named the Working Group Concerning 
the Deterrence of and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy. 
The Working Group released their report on June 17, 2003 (see Appendix A: Air Force Academy 
Timeline). The Working Group concluded as a result of their investigation that there was “no 
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systemic acceptance of sexual assault at the Academy, no institutional avoidance of 
responsibility, or systemic maltreatment of cadets who report sexual assault” (Report of the 
Working Group, 2003, pg.ii) at the Air Force Academy (Report of the Working Group, 2003). 
  Despite their conclusions the Working Group did find inconsistencies in the treatment of 
sexual assault cases at the Academy.  They found that in some years the command had a direct 
focus on sexual assault and in other years they focused less on sexual assault and more on other 
cases. The Working Group found that after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 the 
academy shifted its focus from sexual assault to security issues (Report of the Working Group, 
2003).  
 The Sexual Assault Services Committee at the Air Force Academy was set up in 1996 in 
order to address sexual assault problems and policy at the Academy. The Working Group found 
that this committee had only met 5 times between 2000 and 2002. The Sexual Assault Services 
Committee, as a result, failed to fully understand the sexual assault problems at the Academy and 
failed to inform leadership of the problems (Report of the Working Group, 2003).  
 The Working Group found a culture in the Academy where cadets made sexist and 
sexualized comments but could not make a definitive connection between this culture and the 
problem of sexual assault. The Working Group mentioned the problems with underage drinking 
in their report as well as the housing arrangements of female cadets. The Working Group 
suggested that the alcohol policies at the Academy contributed to the sexual assault problems and 
suggested more strict punishments for underage drinking. The report also suggested new housing 
arrangements for female cadets because they were often situated on coed floors forcing the girls 
to walk through the halls and robes and athletic attire (Report of the Working Group, 2003).  
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 The Air Force Office of Special Investigation identified fifty-six cases of sexual assault at 
the Air Force Academy between January 7, 1993 and February 21, 2003 (Schmitz, 2004a). Of 
these cases there were thirty-one allegations of rape, eighteen allegations of indecent assault, 
four allegations of offenses against a child, two allegations of sodomy, and one allegation of 
attempted rape. Of the fifty-six total cases, three cases were dropped after the victims withdrew 
their complaints. Fifty- one percent of the remaining fifty-three cases involved a freshman cadet 
victim and freshman cadet assailant. Eleven Percent of the fifty-three cases involved a freshman 
cadet and an upperclassmen cadet (Schmitz, 2004a). 
 DoD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz reviewed AFOSI’s investigation of the 
allegations. He began his review in March 2003. DoD Inspector General Schmitz found many 
flaws in the initial investigation of the fifty-six cases of sexual assault. The flaws in the 
investigation include the following. Out of the fifty-six cases identified ten were missing an 
investigative step. In three of the fifty-six cases, forensic science was suggested but not used in 
the investigation. In two of fifty-six cases, reports did not indicate why some evidence was 
collected, but not sent to the laboratory for analysis (Schmitz, 2004b). 
 Flaws in the investigation stage can be detrimental to sexual assault cases. Investigators 
fall in the chain of command and therefore have a responsibility to conduct a thorough 
investigation. Although the flaws in the investigation stage are worth noting because of their 
relation to the chain of command, Schmitz did not conclude the flaws in the investigation as the 
root cause of the sexual assault problem at the Air Force Academy.  
 DoD Inspector General Schmitz concluded that the overall root cause of the sexual 
assault problem at the Air Force Academy was the failure of the chain of command over the past 
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ten years (1993-2003). He noted that the chain of command failed to implement and monitor the 
changes necessary to alter the culture conducive to sexual assault (Schmitz, 2004b). He stated 
“Many leaders in positions of authority could have been better role models, could have 
been more vigilant in inspecting those placed under their command, failed to guard and 
suppress sexual misconduct among cadets, whether or not prosecutable as specific crime, 
and failed to hold cadets accountable for such misconduct (Smith, 2004, para 4)”. 
 After the Department of Defense Inspector General and the Working Group conducted 
their reports former Florida Congresswoman Tillie K. Fowler lead an independent panel to 
review sexual assault allegations at the Air Force Academy. This panel included seven members 
whom had a background in United States military academies, behavioral and psychological 
sciences and standards and practices relating to proper treatment of sexual assault victims. The 
panel was the first independent review panel of the sexual assault allegations at the Air Force 
Academy (Fowler, 2003).  
 The Panel to Review Sexual Assaults at the Air Force Academy faulted the Working 
Panel for not evaluating the fault of the leadership at the Air Force Academy. Instead they 
focused only on the sexual assault incidents at the Academy. The panel suggested that this may 
be because the Working Group was trying to protect leadership from public criticism. The panel 
also found that Academy leadership had been warned many times by many different agencies 
that the Academy had a sexual assault problem but did not respond accordingly (see Appendix 
B: Air Force Timeline). The working group did not mention this.  
 The Panel found that the Air Force Academy, as well as Air Force Leadership, has been 
aware of the sexual assault problems at the Academy since at least 1993 (evidence is provided in 
Appendix A: Air Force Timeline ii). There has been an average of 14 allegations of sexual 
assault per year from 1993 to 2003.  Air Force Academy leadership failed to maintain a 
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consistent level of oversight of the sexual assault problem and failed to develop a solution to the 
problem (Fowler, 2003).  
 The Panel concluded that the problem of sexual assault at the Air Force Academy was a 
leadership problem. The following military leadership were identified by the Panel for 
contributing to the sexual assault problem at the Air Force Academy.  
 Major General John R. Dallagher was the acting superintendent of the Air Force 
Academy from 1999-2003. As superintendent the Panel believes he bears the most responsibility 
for the Academy’s sexual assault problem. He failed to exercise effective leadership and failed to 
respond to the sexual assault problem (Fowler, 2003).  
  Brigadier General Wagie had the most insight into the sexual assault response program 
at the academy. Due to this insight the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the 
U.S. Air Force Academy said that Brigadier General Wagie had “considerable institutional 
knowledge of the nature and extent of the Academy’s sexual misconduct problems due to his 
responsibilities and lengthy tenure at the Academy spanning 16 years” (Fowler, 2003, p.39). 
Brigadier General Wagie failed to recognize and or take effective action to prevent the sexual 
assaults at the Air Force Academy (Fowler, 2003). 
General S. Taco Gilbert III had a responsibility as a senior commander to protect cadets 
from sexual assault. It was also his responsibility to be informed about the previous sexual 
assault incidences and sexual assault response and reporting procedures.  As a senior commander 
to Colonel Laurie Slavec, he is also responsible for her actions. General Gilbert III told the Panel 
that he was going to remove Colonel Slavec from leadership however; in April 2003 he awarded 
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her a merit medal for her mentorship of those under her command. Colonel Slavec’s failures are 
detailed in the following paragraph. 
Colonel Slavec’s harsh leadership created a sense of fear in the cadets under her 
command. Under Colonel Slavec’s leadership cadets indicated that they feared reporting their 
sexual assaults as they felt there would be repercussions. They did not feel safe. Colonel Slavec, 
when interviewed by the Panel, did not know what the Academy’s definition of sexual assault 
was. She indicated that she had her own definition of what she called a “true rape” which 
involved force.  Colonel Slavec also indicated that she thought many women report rape at the 
Academy in order to receive amnesty from charges relating to consensual sex (i.e. adultery, 
fraternizing) (Fowler, 2003). 
Charges 
In the wake of the sexual assault scandal, four Air Force officials were replaced. These 
officials include: Superintendent James G. Roche, his second in command, Brigadier General S. 
“Taco” Gilbert III, Vice Commandant Colonel Robert D. Eskridge and commander of cadet 
training Colonel Laurie S. Slavec (Schemo & Moss, 2003). Details on individual sexual assault 
cases were not made available. The focus of these reports was on the sexual assault response and 
policies at the academy. The following is a summary of the chain of command problems from 
the air force academy. It includes the main results from all reports.  
Command Problems 
Both the Panel to Review Sexual Assaults at the Air Force Academy and DoD Inspector 
General Schmitz concluded that the Air Force has known for at least 10 years that sexual assault 
was a serious problem at the Academy. Despite that knowledge the Air Force did not take the 
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necessary steps to fix the problem. The Panel, The Working Group and Schmitz noted that there 
was inconsistent oversight of sexual assault problems. Some issues were the lack of regular 
meetings of the Sexual Assault Services Committee and the turnover rate of leadership (Fowler, 
2003).  
Culture was cited by The Panel, The Working Group, and DoD Inspector General 
Schmitz as a contributing factor to the sexual assaults at the Academy. Cadets at the Air Force 
Academy reported sexism and sexualized comments as being prevalent to the point where such 
comments were normal. In a sexual assault survey at the Academy 1 in five cadets indicated that 
they don’t believe women belong at the Academy. The Panel and DoD Inspector General 
indicated that the Academy leadership failed to alter the culture at the Academy creating an 
environment conducive to sexual assault (Schmitz, 2004b).  
Attitudes amongst senior officers in the command contributed to the sexual assault 
problem. Brigadier General S. “Taco” Gilbert III was quoted as saying “For example, if I walk 
down a dark alley with hundred- dollar bills hanging out of my pockets, it does not justify my 
being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the risk by doing what I did” (Fowler, 2003, 
para 4). This was a response when asked about a female cadet who was raped after an evening of 
drinking and playing strip poker Also Colonel Slavec, as previously mentioned, believed that 
women were essentially lying about their sexual assault. Colonel Slavec was responsible for 
reporting sexual assaults as a commander and her attitudes prevented victims from reporting 
(Fowler, 2003).  
Policies and Procedures Post Academy Sexual Assault 
44 
 
After the sexual assault incidences at the Air Force Academy, many of the procedures 
were changed for the incoming class in 2004. The changes made were a part of the Secretary of 
the Air Force’s Agenda for Change. This agenda outlines 165 changes that Air Force officials 
believe needed to be changed. The Air Force as of 2004 had adopted 140 of these 165 changes 
(Miles, 2003).  
There were several key changes the Air Force made after the sexual assault scandal. One 
change was creating new sexual assault reporting procedures. These include adding a new team 
for responding to sexual assault incidences (Bearden, 2003). The Air Force also implemented an 
education program for cadets that would address sexual assault and harassment (Miles, 2003).  
Alcohol was found to be involved in 40 percent of sexual assault cases and in response 
Academy officials implemented strict alcohol regulations. After the second infraction for 
drinking a cadet would be kicked out of the Academy (Miles, 2003). Superintended Rosa is 
responsible for implementing many of these changes however Rosa acknowledged that the 




Chapter 6: Limitations and Conclusions 
 The findings support the research question that the sexual assault reporting process in the 
military contributes to the pervasiveness of sexual assault in the military. As demonstrated in the 
case studies, the chain of command as a reporting mechanism has proven to be ineffective. This 
is not only true when a victim reports to their immediate commander but the chain of command 
also fails as you go higher up in the chain of command. As indicated in the case studies, even 
when higher-ranking officers understood there was an epidemic of sexual assault they failed to 
take action. The chain of command also does not stand alone as the sole contributor to the sexual 
assault problem. The military culture also contributes to the problem. It is the suggestion of this 
research that the sexual assault reporting process, in combination with military culture, needs to 
be changed in order to alleviate the pervasiveness of sexual assault in the military. The following 
provides support that these changes need to take place.  
 As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the military culture greatly contributes to the 
pervasiveness of sexual assault in the military. During the course of this research several 
indicators that military culture contributed to the pervasiveness of sexual assault were identified. 
Based on the findings in each case study it is clear that the military culture needs to be changed 
in order to eliminate the sexual assault problem.  When taking into account the recent elimination 
of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy as well as the inclusion of women in combat positions, the 
need for this change in culture is of high importance. These policies will lead to increased 
animosity towards already targeted groups. The following are examples of military culture found 
in the case studies used in this research.  
 The Tailhook Symposium in 1991 was the first high profile sexual assault scandal in the 
military. It brought to light not only these cases of sexual assault, but also the problems 
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surrounding the military culture. The Department of Defense Inspector General Vander Schaff 
found that a commonality among military personnel interviewed during his investigation was 
that they lacked an awareness of the detrimental cultural repercussions of their actions. He 
indicated that the behavior that took place at Tailhook (i.e. the Gauntlet, prostitution, zapping, 
etc.) “fostered an atmosphere of sexual harassment” (Vander Schaff, 1992, para.38). The 
acceptance of this behavior can be explained by two of Hunter’s aspects of military culture. As 
explained in chapter 2, one aspect of military culture is the objectification of people. Military 
personnel are taught to dehumanize the enemy. The perpetrators in the Tailhook scandal may 
have used this tactic in order to dehumanize their victims and therefore did not see their actions 
as wrong (Hunter, 2007). 
 Attitudes among the military personnel at Tailhook also contributed to the military 
culture. Men wore shirts stating, “Women are Property”. These shirts, indicative of the attitudes 
of the men at the Tailhook Symposium, contributed to the sexual assault problem by condoning 
the sexual assault of women (Frontline, 1993). The attitudes did not cease with lower ranking 
officers but were displayed by higher ranking officers such as Commander of the Naval 
Investigative Service Duvall Williams who indicated to the Under Secretary of the Navy that he 
believed most women in the military were hookers (Ogden, 2009). Also, the fact that the chain of 
command was present and did nothing to stop this behavior suggests their silent 
acknowledgement of this behavior. Again, Hunter’s military culture characteristic, 
objectification of people, can help explain why these attitudes exist. Women are dehumanized by 
men the same way an enemy is. In fact, women are often seen as the enemy in the military 
because men believe they cannot adequately perform their duties. Men are also threatened by 
women because they may take their ranks and positions (Hunter, 2007).  
47 
 
 At Aberdeen, drill sergeants treated sex as if it were a game. They literally made a game 
out of having sex with cadets. Cadets were treated as prizes to be won and not as human beings. 
This dehumanization of the victim, an aspect of military culture, created a culture where sexual 
assault was accepted.  
 As demonstrated in the Air Force Academy case, the academy had cultural problems. The 
cultural problems are evident in the attitudes of those at the academy. These attitudes are 
reflected in statements made by both Colonel Laurie Slavec and General S. Taco Gilbert III. 
Colonel Slavec indicated that she did not know the Air Force’s definition of sexual assault but 
her own definition, which she regarded as true rape, required some kind of force. General Gilbert 
said in a statement “For example, if I walk down a dark alley with hundred- dollar bills hanging 
out of my pockets, it does not justify my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the 
risk by doing what I did” (Fowler, 2003, para 4). Both of these statements are from high- ranking 
officers. Colonel Slavec and General Gilbert’s statements contribute to a rape culture. Colonel 
Slavec misconstrues rape to only include incidents of force and Gilbert’s statement clearly shows 
victim blaming. Although the military culture needs to be changed in order to fix the sexual 
assault problem in the military the process must also change if any real progress is to be made.  
 All three case studies show a need for changes in the reporting process through the chain 
of command. This research found two main problems with the sexual assault reporting. The first 
is that the sexual assault reporting process, through the chain of command, creates a conflict of 
interest that prevents commanding officers from investigating and prosecuting a victim’s sexual 
assault case. The second problem is the intimidation that victims feel towards the process and the 
command staff results in non- reporting.  
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 This “conflict of interest” refers to two issues. The first is that the job description of a 
commanding officer does not coincide with sexual assault reporting. It is the duty of a 
commanding officer to ensure those under his command act appropriately. When a sexual assault 
happens it can reflect badly on the officer because it is considered to have happened under his or 
her command. In order to prevent sanction, a commanding officer may choose not to report that a 
sexual assault occurred. This may have been a contributing factor in Lt. Coughlin’s case. This is 
not only true for commanding officers however, in both the Air Force case and the Tailhook case 
high ranking individuals in the chain of command had knowledge that there was a sexual assault 
problem. They failed to respond to this problem. It is possible that they did not respond because 
they did not want to face scrutiny of Congress, the President, and the general public.  
 The second conflict of interest occurs when the sexual offender in a sexual assault case is 
the commanding officer. This is very clearly in the Aberdeen Case study. The drill sergeants 
acted as the commanding officers to the privates. If the privates wanted to report their sexual 
assault they would have to do so to their commanding officer. The privates were the victims in 
this case making their attackers their commanding officers. This made it very difficult for 
victims to report their sexual assault. 
 Intimidation was another problem found in this research. This is evident in all of the case 
studies. Colonel Slavec (Air Force Academy) was identified in the Panel’s report for creating an 
environment that made it difficult to report sexual assaults. Her attitude, as well as her brutal 
commanding style made the cadets feel unsafe (Report of the Working Group, 2003). The way in 
which the Air Force sexual assault scandal came to light is also indicative of intimidation. 
Instead of a victim alerting her commanding officer that there was a sexual assault problem at the 
academy someone sent an anonymous email. The fact that email was chosen as the method of 
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reporting in it and of itself is evidence that there is an intimidation factor in the reporting process 
through the chain of command. 
 What results from both of these problems is a lack of reporting and lack of punishment in 
sexual assault cases. When there is a lack of punishment it gives offenders the idea that it is okay 
to commit sexual assault. This further contributes to the problem. The following provides 
suggestions to prevent sexual assault in the military.  
 Because this research did not exclusively focus on the culture of the military, 
recommendations will not be made on how to improve military culture, although it is the belief 
of the researcher that the culture needs to be changed. The following are suggestions on how to 
improve the sexual assault reporting process in the military. 
 Passing the Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013 would have a significant impact on 
sexual assault cases. The bill would remove the prosecutions of any crime of more than a year in 
prison from the victims or offenders chain of command. The commanding officer trying the case 
would have to have significant experiences with criminal cases. This would improve the 
punishment stage of sexual assault cases. 
 Although the Military Justice Improvement Act would be a good start in improving how 
sexual assaults are handled in the military it does not address the reporting problems. This 
research suggests creating an independent body for reporting and investigating crimes in the 
military. These crimes would be all non-military specific crimes. By creating an independent 
entity where victims can report their crimes without intimidation and conflict of interest would 
solve significant problems with reporting. This research also suggests an independent Navy 
Inspector General and NCIS as this will ensure an independent review of all crimes without the 
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Appendix A: Timelines 
Timeline Tailhook ‘91 
September 5-8, 1991 – 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium held at Las Vegas Hilton. 
September 7, 1991- Lieutenant (Lt) Paula Coughlin is sexually assaulted during the Gauntlet. 
September 8, 1991- Lt Coughlin reports her assault to her superior Rear Admiral Snyder. 
September 22, 1991- Lt Coughlin follows up with Rear Admiral Snyder on the status of her 
report 
September 28, 1991- Lt Coughlin sends a letter to Rear Admiral Snyder’s superior, Vice Admiral 
Dunleavy.  
October 10, 1991- Vice Admiral Dunleavy launches an investigation into Lt Coughlin’s sexual 
assault.  
October 11, 1991 – the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) launches an investigation into 
Tailhook sexual assaults.  
October 31, 1991 – Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett ends the Navy’s membership in 
the Tailhook Association. 
November 10, 1991 – Rear Admiral Snyder is relieved of his command. 
April 30, 1992 – The Navy Inspector General Davis and the NIS issue the final reports of their 
investigation into Tailhook.  
June 18, 1992 – Navy Secretary Garrett asks Department of Defense Inspector General Vander 
Schaff to conduct an independent investigation of Tailhook. 
 June 26, 1992 – Navy Secretary Garrett resigns as requested by President George H Bush.    
September 24, 1992 – DoD Inspector General Vander Schaaf issues his initial report on the 
investigation of the Tailhook sexual assaults.   
April 1993 –DoD Inspector General Vander Schaff releases his ﬁnal report on Tailhook ’91. 
April 28, 1993 – Defense Secretary Aspin issues order to allow women to ﬂ y combat missions. 
May-Sept 2003 – Navy and Marine Corps investigate citations of 140 personnel named in the 
DoD Tailhook Report. 
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February 8, 1994 – Norfolk military judge, Cpt. Willam T. Vest, drops all remaining cases 
related to Tailhook ’91 because Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Adm. Kelso, who attended 
Tailhook ’91 and witnessed some of the lewd behavior, exercised unlawful command inﬂuence 
in the prosecution of the aviators. 
May 31, 1994 – Lt. Coughlin resigns from the Navy 






Aberdeen Timeline  
Timeline: Aberdeen Sexual Assault 
September 1996- female trainee Private Jessica Bleckley at the Aberdeen Proving Ground’s 
Ordnance Center complained to her superior officer about sexual harassment. This started the 
investigation into Aberdeen Proving Ground. 
November 1996- thirty four women reported being victims of rape or sexual assault at Aberdeen 
Proving Ground 
November 6, 1996- toll-free hotline set up for sexual assault victims. 
November 21,1996- Secretary of the Army Togo West establishes the Secretary of the Army’s 
Senior Review Panel. 
December 6, 1996- Capt. Derrick Robertson, Sgts. Delmar Simpson and Nathanael Beech 
arraigned on charges 
January 23, 1997- 4
th
 soldier charged in Aberdeen. Sgt 1
st
 class Theron Brown charged with two 
counts of failure to obey order, one count of sodomy, and two counts of adultery involving two 
female students and one civilian.  
January 30, 1997- Army receives a total of 6,979 calls to the hotline since it was created in 
November 1996. 
February 1, 1997- Sixth soldier charged in the sexual assault at Aberdeen- the first to result from 
the army set up hotline- Sgt Isiah Chestnut- charged with indecent assault involving four women 
trainees. 
March 20, 1997- Sergeant Derrick Robertson plead guilty having consensual sex with a female 
trainee, as well as, consensual sodomy, conduct unbecoming an officer and dereliction of duty 
March 23, 1997- Nathanial Beech found not guilty on charges of sexual misconduct. Was found 
guilty of abuse of authority and failure to obey an order. Beech was taken off the promotion list, 
received a suspended penalty and forfeiture of pay and allowances.  
April 3, 1997- 11
th
 Army Staff member charged in sex scandal- SGT Marvin Kelly accused of 
having improper relationship with six female trainees and one female soldier stationed at 
Aberdeen 
April 4, 1997- Two of the sexual abuse charges were dropped against Sergeant Delmar Simpson 
because they were more difficult to prove 
April 11, 1997- Sergeant First Class Tony Cross convicted on 13 counts of adultery and sodomy. 
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April 15, 1997- Rape victims testify in Simpson’s trial. 
May 6, 1997- Staff Sgt. Delmar G. Simpson found guilty on 18 of 19 counts of rape and was 
sentenced to 25 years in prison at Fort Leavenworth.  
May 31, 1997- Staff Sgt Vernell Robinson Jr convicted of 19 counts including sodomy, adultery, 
communicating a threat, obstructing justice and disobeying orders. Robinson received six month 
sentence.  






Timeline: 2003 Air Force Sexual Assault i 
January 2, 2003- Secretary of the Air Force James G Roche receives an email under pseudonym Renee 
Trundle alleging that there was a serious sexual assault problem at the Air Force Academy.  
 Immediately after receiving the email Secretary Roche tasked General Counsel of the Air Force 
Mary L. Walker with creating a working group to review cadet complaints about the sexual 
assault problem.  
March 2003- Interim report of the Working Group Report released to Secretary of the Air Force Roche 
March 2003- Secretary of the Air Force Roche and Air Force Chief of Staff General Jumper created an 
Agenda for Change which included policy improvements at the Academy 
March 2003- Department of Defense Inspector General Schmitz starts his investigation into the Air Force 
Academy’s sexual assault problem. 
April 2003- Lieutenant General John R. Dallager, Superintendent of the Academy was forced to retire and 
Commandant Brigadier General S. Taco Gilbert II, the Vice Commandant, Colonel Robert D. Eskridge 
and the Training Wing Commander Colonel Laurie S. Slavec were all reassigned. Secretary Roche 
replaced them with new leadership at the Academy.  
April 16, 2003- The Panel to Review Sexual Assault at the Air Force Academy is established.   
June 2003- Air Force General Counsel Mary L. Walker releases The Working Group Report 
July 11, 2003- General Dallager’s retirement is announced at the grade of Major General rather than 
Lieutenant General. General Dallager was retired at a lower grade because he should have been aware of 
the problems at the Academy and should have taken action in the form of solutions to the problem.  
September 22, 2003- The Panel to Review Sexual Assault at the Air Force Academy releases its final 
report.  





Timeline: 2003 Air Force Academy ii 
February 1993-  Sexual assault incident. Brigadier General Bradley C. Hosmer created an 
informal confidential reporting procedure for sexual assaults. Another change was the institution 
of a victim amnesty program to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults. Under the amnesty 
policy, the chain of command could forego punishment of victim misconduct in order to 
encourage the reporting of sexual assault 
1993- There were 18 allegations of sexual assault at the Air Force Academy 
January 1994- The General Accounting Office (GAO) releases a report at each of the service 
academies. The report indicates that sexual harassment occurs at all service academies. There is 
no indication that the Academy took any action upon receiving the GAO’s report. 
1994- 14 allegations of sexual assault 
1995- 17 allegations of sexual assault  
March 1995- GAO issues a follow up report from the 1994 investigation of sexual harassment. 
They conclude that the sexual harassment problem has not improved.  
1996- 15 allegations of sexual assault  
1996- Air Force headquarters discovered the procedures put in place in February 1993 to address 
sexual assault were not working. Confidential reporting was interfering with AFOSI’s 
investigations.  
1996- The Air Force Surgeon General tells the Air Force Chief of Staff that there was sexual 
misconduct at the academy. There is no evidence that the Air Force fully investigated this 
allegation.  
1996-1997- a team of lawyers at the Air Force Headquarters recommends changes in the 
Academy’s procedures for reporting sexual assault. The Air Force Academy rejects these 
suggested changes. Air Force Headquarters accepted the procedures but failed to monitor them.  
2000-2001- the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) complained that the 
Academy’s sexual assault reporting procedure’s (confidential reporting) interfered with their 
investigations.  A working group was created to investigate these procedures. Air Force 
Headquarters reached an agreement with the AFOSI but the Air Force Headquarters failed to 
ensure the agreement was implemented 
2000- Senate Armed Services Committee requests an investigation into the allegations made by 
the former Air Force Surgeon General in 1996 that there was sexual misconduct at the Air Force 
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Academy and it had been covered up or not investigated. The Air Force Inspector general only 







Appendix B: Chain of Command Structure With Key Players (Highest to Lowest Rank) 
 
Tailhook  
Military Rank Insignia  Name Role in Tailhook 
Secretary of the Navy  H. Lawrence Garrett Asked to retired by George H. 




 George Davis Reassigned after Department 
of Defense Inspector General 
found flaws in Davis’ 
investigation 
Chief of Naval 
Operations 
 Frank Kelso Rumored to have been present 
during the gauntlet and 
rumored to have lied about 









Richard Dunleavy Admitted to knowing that the 
gauntlet and prostitution took 




 Riley Mixson 
 Wilson Flagg 
 Jack Snyder 
Mixson and Flagg admitted to 
knowing of past improprieties 
at Tailhook and not doing 
anything to prevent future 
behavior 
Snyder failed to report the 




 Several captains were cited 
for witnessing and 




 Several commanders were 
cited for witnessing and 








































Derrick Robertson One of the three 
original creators of 
the game. Convicted 
of consensual sex 
with a female trainee, 
consensual sodomy, 
conduct unbecoming 
of an officer and 







Sergeant Major of 
the Army 
















Sergeant First Class 
 
 Tony Cross One of the three 
original creators of 
the game. Convicted 
on 13 counts of 






 Delmar Simpson 
 Nathanial Beech 
 Simpson 
convicted on 16 
counts of rape 
against 6 females. 
Sentenced to 25 
years. 
 Beech was 
charged with 
adultery after his 
rape charge was 















Air Force Academy 
Military Rank Insignia Name Role in Air Force 
Academy Sexual 
Assaults 






S. Taco Gilbert III Failed as overseer of the 
sexual assault reporting 
and response program as 
well as bears 
responsibility for Slavec 






John R. Dallagher As acting superintendent 
bears the most 
responsibility for the 
failure of the academy in 




David Wagie Had knowledge of the 
sexual assault problems 
at the Academy  
Colonel 
 
Laurie Slavec Created an environment 
where cadets were not 
comfortable reporting 
assaults. Contributed to 
the negative attitudes 
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